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What Explains the Incidence of the Use of
a Common Sediment Control on Lots with
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Wallace A. Campbell, and John C. Hayes
To analyze compliance with one aspect of the regulation of stormwater discharge, we esti-
mate a random-utility model of the probability that a builder uses a silt fence to control
sediments on a lot with a house under construction in an urbanizing county of South Carolina.
The probability increases if the builder is responsible to the subdivision’s developer or if
a homeowners association exists. The probability also increases as the cost to install a silt
fence decreases or the number of houses under construction per built house in a subdivision
increases. The results can help county officials target inspection to improve compliance.
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Background
Urbanization of land use is increasingly com-
monintheUnitedStates.Thearea ofdeveloped
land—urban, built-up, and rural transportation
land—increased47.4%,from72.8millionacres
to 107.3 million acres during 1982–2002 in
the 48 contiguous states of the United States
(NRCS, 2004). Land development apparently
accelerated during 1982–2002 in the lower 48
states; the area of developed land increased
18.8% during 1982–1992 and then 24.0% dur-
ing 1992–2002 (NRCS, 2004). Although land-
useurbanizationaccompanieseconomicgrowth,
the process of land-use conversion, particularly
the removal of vegetation and disturbance of
proportionally large areas of soil, can adversely
affect aquatic environments.
In the United States, deposition of eroded
sediments impaired 13.2% of assessed rivers
and streams in 1998 (EPA, 2000) and 12.1% of
assessed rivers and streams in 2000 (EPA,
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  2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Association2002). Sedimentation also impaired nine per-
cent of assessed lakes, reservoirs, and ponds in
2000 (EPA, 2002). Construction sites within
developed land areas, urban stream banks
without adequate vegetation, and undeveloped
areas under development were important sour-
ces of these sediments (EPA, 2002).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates discharge of stormwater from
construction sites. As required by 1987 amend-
ments to the Clean Water Act (CWA), the EPA
in November 1990 promulgated Phase I of
a comprehensive national program to address
stormwater discharges. Phase I requires con-
struction operators to obtain coverage under
a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit for discharge of
stormwater from sites where ‘‘large’’ construc-
tion activities occur, i.e., disturb at least five
acres of land or disturb less than five acres but
are parts of larger common plans or sales that
disturb at least five acres (EPA, 2005, pp. 1–2,
and 1997). These activities include grading,
clearing, excavating, and other earth-moving
processes.Asrequiredbythesameamendments
to the CWA, the EPA in December 1999 pro-
mulgated Phase II of the NPDES Stormwater
Program. Phase II expanded the requirement
of permit coverage to operators of sites where
‘‘small’’constructionactivitiesoccur,i.e.,disturb
atleastoneacreofland(EPA,2005,pp.1–2,A-2,
and A-3). Regardless of Phase I or II, con-
struction operators—the developer and all con-
tractors—must develop and implement storm-
water pollution prevention plans (SWPPPs) to
obtainpermitcoveragefromNPDESpermitting
authorities (EPA,2005,p.2;EPA,1997;Sadler,
1998, pp. 17–18). Phases I and II also require
counties, cities, and towns that operate munici-
pal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) to
obtain coverage under an individual NPDES
permittodischargestormwaterrunofffromtheir
conveyance system of drains, pipes, and ditches
(EPA, 2009).Theregulatedmunicipalities must
develop programs to control stormwater runoff
fromconstructionsiteswithintheirjurisdictions
(EPA, 2009).
Stormwater pollution prevention plans must
include locations and descriptions of erosion
and sediment controls (ESCs) that must be
installed prior to construction and maintained in
a timely manner during construction until final
stabilization of the site (Sadler, 1998, pp. 11–17
and 23). ESCs restrain ‘‘solid material, both
mineral and organic, during a land disturbing
activity to prevent its transport out of the dis-
turbed area by means of air, water, gravity, or
ice’’ (DHEC, 2003, Appendix A, p. 9). In these
plans, one ofthe most frequentlyspecified ESCs
at construction sites is a silt fence,orfilter fabric
(Figure 1 and Paterson, 2000, p. 351).
Previous Research
In spite of regulations, silt fences and other
commonly specified erosion and sediment
controls (ESCs) are often not installed during
construction of subdivisions. For example, silt
fences were not installed in 33% of the in-
stances that were specified in ESC plans for
construction sites in North Carolina in 1989
(Paterson, 2000, p. 351). Sediment traps were
not observed in 86% of the instances that were
specified in ESC plans for construction sites
in Greenville County, South Carolina in 2001
(Johns and Gillespie, 2003). Lack of required
ESCs was particularly evident after the in-
frastructural phase of construction (Loew,
Haselbach, and Meadows, 2004).
Researchers have extensively studied fac-
tors that explain whether farmers adopt certain
management practices that conserve soil (e.g.,
Fuglie, 1999; Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola,
Figure 1. Use of a Silt Fence on a Residential
Lot Under Construction in Study Area
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Wiebe, 2000) and how government can pro-
mote conservation (e.g., Setia and Osborn,
1989) in the United States However, the use of
erosion and sediment controls (ESCs) for
nonagricultural activities that disturb land has
not been well studied. In a seminal paper,
Burby and Paterson (1993) analyzed, among
other things, the effects of site characteristics,
capacity and commitment of developers, and
the enforcement system on the degree to which
sediment traps were actually installed as spec-
ified in approved ESC plans at construction
sites during the summer of 1989 in North
Carolina. One important finding was that the
frequency of inspections by regulators im-
proved compliance (Burby and Paterson, 1993,
p. 764). However, the dependent variable in
their model of compliance was a percentage.
In such models that are estimated with least-
squares, predicted compliance can exceed
100% or fall below 0% and marginal effects of
exogenous variables are unrealistically con-
stant, even near 100% and 0% compliance.
Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows (2004) ar-
gued that installation of a silt fence on a lot
during house construction appeared to be
strongly and negatively related to a change be-
fore construction in the lot’s ownership from the
developer to an unaffiliated builder or future
homeowner. Of course, the strength and signif-
icance of any possible effect of ownership
change on the use of filter fabric should be es-
timated with a statistical model andone thatalso
incorporates other possible determinants. In
general, characteristics of the lot, house under
construction, and subdivision in which the lot is
located might affect the benefits and costs, both
psychological and financial, to a builder of
complying with the stormwater pollution pre-
vention plan and, thus, using a silt fence.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze the
magnitude and significance of the effects of
a number of these characteristics on promised
silt-fence use. To this end, we substantially aug-
ment data from Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows
(2004) and use the datatoestimate a logit model
of the probability that a builder uses filter fabric
onaparticularlot.Informationabouttherelative
importance of determinants of promised use ofa
silt fence can help government officials to focus
inspection on certain types of lots, houses, or
subdivisions during construction and, if neces-
sary, revise regulation of dischargers of storm-
water from residential construction sites.
Socio-Economic Model
Our theoretical model of silt-fence use is based
on the following assumptions and facts. A
builder cares about profits, his or her business
reputation, and the neighborhood where he or
she constructs a particular house.1 The builder’s
monetary costs of silt-fence use are primarily
those for installation. His expected financial
costs of nonuse of silt fence are primarily the
expected costs of cleanup and the expected
value of any fine or additional bond payments.
Soil that erodes from the builder’s lot and be-
comes sediment on nearby lots, streets, and
sidewalks can hurt the builder’s reputation and
neighborhood. Thus, if the builder uses a silt
fence, his profits decrease by the cost of silt-
fence installation but his reputation and the
neighborhood’s welfare remain intact. If the
builder does not use a silt fence, he avoids the
cost of installation but his expected profits de-
crease by the cost of any cleanup or penalty.
Moreover, his reputation and the neighbor-
hood’s welfare decrease, to some extent, if he
does not use a silt fence.
In formal terms, profits (p) of a builder
decrease with the costs (C) of the use of a silt
fence on a lot and with cleanup, fines, or other
costs (F) for noncompliance. That is, p(C, F)
and pC < 0 and pC < 0 and pF < 0. Costs of
filter-fabric use depend positively on the lot’s
perimeter (L), i.e., C(L) > 0 and CL > 0. In-
stallation of a silt fence reduces, if not elimi-
nates, off-site deposition of eroded soil, i.e.,
XÆC(L)>0 æ < X(C 5 0). The off-site deposition
of eroded soil from a lot increases with the
disturbed area (A) within the lot, i.e., XA >0 ,
and X(A) ³ 0.
1An anonymous reviewer pointed out the possible
importance of other-regarding preferences, a subject
of growing interest among economists (e.g., Cox,
Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; Lynne, 2006).
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neutral, or good, i.e., R(X, I, S) 2 (2‘, ‘). The
reputation decreases with sediment that is
eroded from the lot (X), i.e., RX < 0, and in-
creases with positive information of residents
(I), i.e., RI > 0. Increases in the degree to which
the residents are socially connected (S) amplify
the builder’s reputation. That is, RS >0i fR >0 ,
RS 5 0i fR 5 0, and RS <0i fR <0 . 2 Increases
in the degree to which the residents are orga-
nized also amplify the negative marginal effect
of off-site accumulated soil on reputation, i.e.,
RSX <0 .
The state of the neighborhood where the
builder works can also be bad, neutral, or good,
i.e., N(X, S) 2 (2‘, ‘). The well-being of the
neighborhood decreases with off-site accumu-
lation of eroded soil, i.e., NX < 0. An increase
in the solidarity of residents of the subdivision
where the builder works improves the welfare
of the neighborhood, i.e., NS > 0. Increases in
off-site deposition of eroded soil from a lot
reduce the marginal effects of a subdivision’s
social connectivity on the neighborhood’s
welfare, i.e., NSX <0 .
Increases in off-site deposition of eroded
soil from a lot with a house under construction
or from all such lots per occupied house in
a subdivision raise the probability that a resi-
dent is adversely affected by the sediment and,
thus, complains to her neighbors, the builder,
or regulatory authorities. Residents who are
organized are also more likely to monitor a
builder and complain about dirtied sidewalks,
streets, or adjacent yards. If a builder works for
a developer or is the developer, he is also more
likely to clean up soil that erodes off the lot for
lack of a silt fence. Thus, the probability (p)
that a builder incurs financial costs for cleanup
or fines (F) increases with off-site deposition of
eroded soil from the lot (X), off-site deposition
of eroded soil from all lots with houses under
construction per household in the subdivision
(H), the degree towhich residents are organized
(S), and the extent to which the builder is
responsible to the developer (D). That is, 0 £
p(D, H, S, X) £ 1, pD >0 ,pH > 0, and pS > 0, and
pX > 0. The probability of cleanup or penalty
is zero if a silt fence is installed, i.e., pÆD, H, S,
X(C >0 ) æ 5 0.
The builder’s utility depends positively on
profits, business reputation, and the welfare
of the neighborhood where he works, i.e.,
UÆp(C, F), R(X, I, S), N(X, S)æ, Up >0 ,UR >0 ,
and UN > 0. The builder’s expected utility
of his use of a silt fence, E(U
u), is
EðUuÞ5UÆpðCðLÞ >0 ,F50Þ,
RX u,I,SÞ,NðXu,SÞ ð æ,
in which X
u [ XÆC(L)>0 æ.
The builder’s expected utility of nonuse of
a silt fence, E(U
n), equals the sum of the
expected utilities of nonuse when the builder
does and does not pay for cleanup or penalties.
That is,







n [ XÆC 5 0æ. The builder’s decision




UÆpðCðLÞ >0 ,F 50Þ,RðXu,I,SÞ,NðXu,SÞæ
  UÆpðC5F 50Þ,RðXn,I,SÞ,NðXn,SÞæ>
pU ÆpðC 50,F >0 Þ,RðXn,I,SÞ,NðXn,SÞæ ð
  UÆpðC5F 50Þ,RðXn,I,SÞ,NðXn,SÞæÞ.
In words, the builder uses a silt fence if he
prefers to protect his reputation and the
neighborhood’s well being but incur the costs
of installation rather than incur the expected
costs of cleanup or any penalty for non use.
Econometric Model and Procedures
To transform theory into an estimable model
(e.g., Train, 2003), let Eð ~ U
i
tÞ5   ~ Ui
t 1~ ui
t, i 5 u
for use or n for non-use of silt fence and t 5 1,
...,o rT for a particular lot with a house under
construction. The term   ~ Ui
t represents the de-
terministic and knowable mean, from the
point of view of the researcher, of the expected
utility of choice i on lot t.T h et e r m~ ui
t repre-
sents independently distributed random, but
2R(X, I, S) 5 r(S)g(X, I), r(S)>0 ,r9(S) > 0, and
g(X, I) 2 (2‘, ‘) is one specification of R(X, I, S)i n
whichanincreaseinSamplifiesthe builder’s reputation.
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effect on the expected utility of choice i at lot t.
Each term has a ‘‘;’’ because each must be
subsequently transformed. Given the expected
utilities, the probability in the researcher’s mind
thata builderusesa silt fence ona particularlott
is
Pt5Pr   ~ Ut
u1~ uu





t  ~ un
t >   ~ Ut




t <   ~ Ut





In light of the theory and available data, let




t~ b2 1Z3,t~ b
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t >0 is the monetary cost of silt-fence
installation and Cn
t 50. Z3,t, ..., ZK,t are K-2
lot, house, or subdivision variables that affect
the amount of eroded soil that is deposited
away from the lot and adversely affects resi-
dents, the builder’s reputation, or the proba-
bility that the builder must incur costs for
noncompliance. ~ b
i
1 is a choice-specific constant
that represents the nonzero mean effect of
omitted variables on the expected utility of use
or nonuse of a silt fence. ~ b2 is the marginal
expected utility of money for installation of
a silt fence. ~ b
i
3, ..., and ~ b
i
K are marginal effects
of corresponding exogenous variables on the
expected utility of the i-th choice.
Assume that ~ ui
t is identically distributed so
thatvarð~ ui
tÞ5s2
18t. Furthermore, assume that
~ ui
t is an extreme-value random variable with
variance s2p2=65s2
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t is extreme value but has
a variance of p
2/6, which is customary (Train,
2003, p. 44), the probability that the builder
uses a silt fence on lot t is logistic, namely
Pt 5
expð   U
u
t Þ
expð   U
n
t Þ1 expð   U
u
t Þ.I f   Ut[   U
u





k   b
n
k for k 6¼ 2, then Pt 5
expð   UtÞ
11 expð   UtÞ, in which
  Ut5b11Cu
tgb21Z3,tgb31   1ZK,tgbK5b9Xt.
Let yt 5 1 for use or 0 for nonuse of a silt





yt 1   Pt ðÞ
1 yt. The
vector b was estimated by the Newton-Raphson
algorithm in the LOGIT procedure of STATA
Version 9.2 to maximize L and obtain ^ Pt8t
(StataCorp, 2005). The estimator, ^ b, is con-
sistent, asymptotically efficient, and asymp-
totically normally distributed (Greene, 2003,
pp. 476–480). A robust and consistent estimator
of the asymptotic variance-covariance of ^ b is
P T
t51
^ Ptð1  ^ PtÞXt X9 t
    1 P T
t51





^ Ptð1  ^ PtÞXt X9 t
    1
5 est.asy.Vð^ bÞ
(Train, 2003, pp. 204–205).3
The scaled R
2,o r1  lnLu
lnLc
    ð2=NÞlnLc
,i sa
relatively new and intuitively interpretable
measure of the goodness of fit of dichotomous
dependent variables (Estrella, 1998, p. 198). In
this formula ‘‘Lc’’refers to the maximized value
of the constrained likelihood function in which
K-1 parameters, all except the constant, are
fixed at 0 and ‘‘Lu’’ refers to the maximized
value of L, the unconstrained likelihood. Let
b be the K   1 vector of parameter estimates
and R 5 [0I K-1]b eaK-1   K matrix. AWald
statistic, W 5b9R9 R est.asy.Vð^ bÞ R9
hi  1
Rb,i s
used to test whether at least one exogenous
variable, other than the intercept, affects the
probability of silt-fence use. Given the null
hypothesis that nothing but the constant mat-
ters, this statistic is asymptotically distributed
as a Chi-square random variable with K-1 de-
grees of freedom (Greene, 2003, p. 487).
Data Sources and Variables
Information about the presence of silt fences
comes from an ocular census during September
2003 of all, namely 184, single-family lots with
houses under construction in 14 subdivisions
in Richland County (Loew, Haselbach, and
Meadows, 2004). The mean size ofthe surveyed
lots in a subdivision ranged from 0.075 to 0.75
ofan acre. The mean sales price ofsurveyed lots
with the eventually constructed houses ranged
from $79,599 to $463,290. A predominantly
3Possible correlation across lots within a subdivi-
sion is one justification for estimation of robust
standard errors (Train, 2009).
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County had 320,779 people, 756.41 sq. miles of
land, and, thus, a population density of 424
people per sq. mile in 2000 (Census Bureau,
2009a).
Although county-approved storm water
pollution prevention plans indicated silt fences
were required at all 184 lots, they were ob-
served at only 50 lots. SILTFENCE, the de-
pendent variable of our logit model, equals one
if a lot with a house under construction had any
required silt fence and zero if it did not (Table
1). Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows (2004)
recorded only the subdivision’s name, but not
a lot number or street address, to identify the
184 observations.
To ascertain which specific lots were most
likely observed in the ocular census, we first
used maps and online aerial photographs from
the Assessor’s Office (2008) of Richland
County to determine the names of all streets
within each of the subdivisions. We then ex-
amined the online record of each address and
requested through email any missing in-
formation from the Assessor’s Office to de-
termine the date when, if ever, each lot in
a subdivision was listed as ‘‘improved’’ for the
first time and the year when, if ever, a house
was built on the lot. We then noted the address
of each lot that was listed as ‘‘improved’’ for the
first time at least one week after the date of the
ocular survey and put the addresses that met
this criterion in chronological order from the
earliest to the latest date of the listing. We listed
houses that were under construction at least
a week, instead of one day, after the survey to
allow for lags between completion of con-
struction and official recognition of it and be-
cause construction of a house can appear to be
finished from the outside even though minor
tasks have not been finished on the inside. Fi-
nally, we selected the number of the chrono-
logically ordered addresses equal to the number
of lots that were counted in the survey as hav-
ing had houses under construction.4
The Assessor’s Office’s (2008) online re-
cords for the selected addresses were used to
create the independent variables of the model.
For example, RESDEVEL, an empirical
counterpart of D in the theoretical model,
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (n 5 184) for Silt-Fence Use, Lots, Houses, and Subdivisions
VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
SILTFENCE (5 1 if silt fence was used on
a lot with a house under construction)
0.272 0.446 0 1
RESDEVEL (5 1 if the builder of the house
under construction in a subdivision was the
developer or an affiliate of the developer)a
0.185 0.389 0 1
COSTSF (dollar cost of installation of silt
fence on the lot)
b
233 63.4 85.5 559
HFLOORSPS (100 ft2 of heated floor space per
story of the house under construction)b
14.1 3.20 8.21 18.6
HOA (5 1 if the lot was in a subdivision with
a home owners association)
0.554 0.498 0 1
UNCONPBH (number of houses under
construction per built house in the subdivision)
0.260 0.236 0.0260 1.13
SUBDAGE (years since the first house in the
subdivision was built)
3.91 3.05 0.345 13.8
a This variable equals the proportion of lots that were owned by an affiliate of the developer for 18 of the 184 lots.
b Thesevariables equal themean installation cost and heatedfloor space per story of houses under construction inthe subdivision
where each lot was located for 112 of the 184 lots.
Sources: Loew, Haselbach, and Meadows (2004) and the Assessor’s Office (2008).
4For example, if 20 lots with houses under con-
struction were observed in a particular subdivision, we
selected the 20 addresses of lots that had been listed as
‘‘improved’’ for the first time closest to the eighth day
after the ocular census.
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construction of the house was the developer of
the subdivision where the lot was located and,
thus, the builder worked for or was the de-
veloper. In two of the 14 subdivisions, all lots
with houses under construction—a total of
31—were still owned by the developer. In
contrast, RESDEVEL equals zero for a lot if
the lot’s owner during construction was not the
developer but, instead, was an independent
construction company or the future home
owner(s). In other words, RESDEVEL equals
zero for a lot if the builder was not the de-
veloper and either constructed the house for
sale or under contract with the future home-
owner. In 11 of the 14 surveyed subdivisions
all lots with houses under construction—a
total of 135—were not owned by the de-
veloper or an obvious affiliate.
In the remaining subdivision, the builders of
15 of the 18 houses under construction owned
the lots and were not affiliated with the de-
veloper. However, the construction company of
the three other houses was an affiliate of the
developer. Three of the 18 lots also had silt
fences. Were the three lots with silt fences
among the 15 that were owned by unaffiliated
builders, orexactly the three that were owned by
the developer’s affiliate, or owned by a mixture
of independent and affiliated builders? This
question cannot be answered for lack of ad-
dresses to identify the three lots with silt fen-
ces. As a result, RESDEVEL for each lot
equals 1/6 (5 3/18), which is the proportion of
the surveyed houses that were being built by
the developer’s affiliate.
Online information about the perimeter of
each lot was collected to estimate the cost of
silt-fence installation (Assessor’s Office, 2008).
Assume that a builder installed or would have
installed filter fabric on one-half of a lot’s
perimeter. Expenses for 3 ft. high poly-
propylene filter fabric, labor to install it, over-
head, and profit were $0.76 and $1.30 per linear
foot under ideal and adverse conditions in Co-
lumbia, South Carolina in January 2004
(Murphy, 2005, p. 37; Waier, 2003 p. 53).
COSTSF, C in the theoretical model, equals
one-half the perimeter of the lot with a house
under construction multiplied by $1.03, the
mean expense per linear foot of silt-fence in-
stallation (Table 1).
HFLOORSPS, the final lot-specific vari-
able, equals the ratio of the heated floor space
(100 ft
2) to the number of stories of the house
under construction on a particular lot (Table 1).
Also created with online information from the
Assessor’s Office (2008), HFLOORSPS em-
pirically approximates the theoretical variable
A, the disturbed area within a lot under
improvement.
An individual value for installation costs
and heated floor space per story was accurately
matched with a one or zero for the presence of
a silt fence on 72 lots in five subdivisions be-
cause the surveyed lots in each of these sub-
divisions either all had silt fences or all lacked
them. However, an individual value for
COSTSF and HFLOORSPS could not be ac-
curately matched with a value of SILTFENCE
for the other 112 lots because each of the nine
subdivisions where these lots were located had
some lots with and some lots without silt fen-
ces. In lieu of an accurate method to match
individual values, COSTSF equals, for each of
these 112 lots, the mean cost of silt-fence in-
stallation on lots under improvement in the
subdivision where the lot was located. For the
same reason, HFLOORSPS equals, for each of
the 112 lots, the mean of the ratios of heated
floor space to the number of stories of the
houses under construction in the subdivision
where the lot was located.
Civil penalties for violation of the NPDES
Stormwater Program and South Carolina’s
Sediment, Erosion, and Flood Control Program
could have amounted to as much as $10,000
and $1,000 per day in late 2003 (DHEC, 2001).
However, there is no evidence that a builder was
penalized for noncompliance with the storm-
water pollution prevention plan in Richland
County during late 2003. Recall that the prob-
ability of a fine is part of the probability that
a builder incurs financial costs for nonuse of
a silt fence, or p(D, H, S, X
n) in the theoretical
model. A minor reason why the probability
of a fine approached zero was that inspectors
typically allowed a builder to solve a problem
before penalizing him or her for noncom-
pliance. A major reason why the probability of
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was that county officials usually did not inspect
a subdivision after the infrastructural phase of
development.
What might explain why county officials
rarely inspected when houses were under con-
struction? Richland County had only seven
stormwater managers who had authority to in-
spect construction sites for compliance with
SWPPPs and at most three of them could issue
tickets (Valavala, 2006). The county issued
2,951 permits in 2003 and an estimated 3,340
permits in 2004 to build new privately-owned
residential units,2,896 and 3,246 ofwhichwere
single-family units (Census Bureau, 2009b). If
houses and other residential buildings took, on
average, one year to complete, these officials
had approximately 3,000 residential lots to in-
spect per year. The same officials also had to
review and approve erosion and sediment
control plans and other aspects of the SWPPPs
in advance for each construction site, residen-
tial and commercial too.
Richland County was also required to have
and had an individual NPDES permit to dis-
charge runoff from its medium-sized municipal
separate storm sewer system. As a consequence,
the same officials were required to develop and
implement programs that addressed the fol-
lowing issues, in addition to management of
runoff from sites during construction: 1) con-
trol of runoff from sites after construction;
2) management of roadway runoff; 3) detection
and elimination of illicit discharges; 4) regu-
lation of sites that engaged in industrial activity
other than construction; 5) application of pes-
ticides, herbicides, and fertilizers on urban
landscapes; 6) impacts on water quality of
flood control; 7) discharges and runoff from
landfills, wastewater treatment plants, and other
municipally owned operations; 8) impacts on
water quality of treatment, storage, or disposal
of hazardous wastes; and 9) public education
and outreach (DHEC, 2005). These regulatory
demands on the time of Richland County’s
stormwater officials help to explain why the
expected value of a penalty for nonuse of a silt
fence was close to zero during late 2003.
The Assessor’s Office (2008) was also the
source of information about characteristics of
the subdivisions in which the surveyed lots
were located. HOA equals one for all lots with
houses under construction, 102 of them, in the
nine subdivisions that had a home owners as-
sociation (Table 1). A subdivision had a home
owners association if property tax records in-
dicated that an association owned a pool, club-
house, pond, or common area. Each of the
fourteen subdivisions was also visited in August
2005tocheckforthe presence ofa homeowners
association. HOA is a measure of variable S in
the theoretical model, the social connectivity
within a neighborhood.
For each surveyed lot in a subdivision,
UNCONPBH is the number of houses under
construction per house already built in the sub-
division. For each surveyed lot there were, on
average, four houses alreadybuilt.UNCONPBH
is variable H in the theoretical model.
SUBDAGE equals thenumber ofyears from
the day that the first house in the subdivision
was listed as improved for the first time in the
Assessor’s records to the particular day in
September 2003 when the ocular survey was
conducted. Thus, SUBDAGE is, for each lot
with a house under construction in a particular
subdivision, the subdivision’s age. SUBDAGE
ranged from three monthsto almost 14years and
is a proxy for variable I in the theoretical model.
Results
Three preliminary specifications of the model
were estimated to test for heteroskedastic ran-
dom errors across groups of subdivisions. Sta-
tistical evidence indicated no group-wise het-
eroskedasticity.5 Parameter estimates, robust
standard errors, z-statistics, p values, and sam-
ple-mean marginal and discrete effects of the
variables in the homoskedastic model are pre-
sented in Table 2. The scaled R
2 is 0.545; the
model ‘‘explains’’ 54.5% of the information
about SILTFENCE. Furthermore, 87.5% of the
estimated probabilities of silt-fence use on
a particular lot either exceed 0.5 for lots where
a builder actually used a silt fence or are less
than 0.5 for lots where he did not. The p-value
5These preliminary results are available upon re-
quest from the senior author.
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the test of nonzero slopes is less than 0.001.
Hence, the logit model predicts the probability
better than the sample proportion does.
The estimated parameters of the three lot-
specific variables have expected signs and the
positive or negative effects of the variables
statistically matter at various levels of signifi-
cance (Table 2). The probability that a builder
uses a silt fence on a lot with a house under
construction is 49.8 percentage points higher,
on average, if the builder is affiliated with or
is the developer. The probability approximately
decreases 0.898 percentage points, on average,
for a $10 increase in the cost of silt-fence in-
stallation. The evidence for a positive effect of
HFLOORSPS exists if a 5 0.10. In particular,
the probability of use approximately increases
1.19percentage points, on average, for a 100 ft
2
increase in the heated floor space per story of
the house under construction.
The three characteristics of the residential
development are also statistically significant
(Table 2). The probability that a builder uses
filter fabric on a lot is 27.1 percentage points
higher, on average, in a subdivision with
a home owners association than in a sub-
division without one. The probability increases
about 4.79 percentage points, on average, if the
number of houses under construction per house
already built in a subdivision increases by 10
hundredths, say from 0.50 to 0.60. The proba-
bility is 3.01 percentage points higher in
a subdivision that is one year older.
Discussion
The results are broadly consistent with the
socio-economic model. For example, as the
mean financial costs of installation increase,
the builder is less likely to use a silt fence
because the costs of use increase relative to
costs ofnonuse. Incontrast, the degree towhich
costs of the erosion and sediment control re-
quirements added to total development costs
did not affect the degree to which promised
sediment traps were installed in North Carolina
in 1989 (Burby and Paterson, 1993).
Monetary costs of installation tend to in-
crease with lot size. In particular, the size of
a lot with a house under construction is posi-
tively, strongly, and significantly correlated
with the cost of silt-fence installation on the lot
(r 5 0.948, t 5 40.4) and also with the heated
floor space per story (r 5 0.531, t 5 8.46). As
a result, lot size was insignificant as an ex-
planatory variable in preliminary versions and
excluded in the final version of the model.
If the builder works for the developer who
still owns a particular lot, he is more likely to
be responsible to and monitored by the de-
veloper. If the builder is the developer who still
owns the lot, he is more likely to remember
his financial responsibility for noncompliance
with the storm water pollution prevention plan
(SWPPP). However, if a builder purchases the
lot from a developer or is hired by a future
homeowner, the builder might not file a sepa-
rate SWPPP or be aware of the original one











CONSTANT 26.234 2.126 22.93 0.003
RESDEVEL 3.488 1.057 3.30 0.001 0.498
COSTSF 20.010 0.006 21.70 0.090 20.000898
HFLOORSPS 0.129 0.101 1.29 0.198 0.0119
HOA 2.940 0.991 2.97 0.003 0.271
UNCONPBH 5.234 1.633 3.20 0.001 0.479
SUBDAGE 0.329 0.116 2.83 0.005 0.030
a The marginal effect of the k-th continuous variable on the estimated probability of silt-fence use on the t-th lot is
¶^ Pt
¶Xt,k 5^ bk ^ Ptð1   ^ PtÞ. The discrete effect of the k-th dummy variable on the estimated probability of use at the t-th lot is
^ Pkt   ^ P kt 5
expðX0
 kt ^ b k 1 ^ bkÞ
11 expðX0
 kt ^ b k 1 ^ bkÞ  
expðX0
 kt ^ b kÞ
11 expðX0
 kt ^ b kÞ.
The natural log of the (pseudo) likelihood function is 254.94439.
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by the developer.
As the mean heated floor space per story
of a house under construction increases, the
amount of disturbed soil from the lot tends to
increase because surface areas of foundations
grow with floor space. If the amount of dis-
turbed soil per lot increases, the potential
amount of eroded sediments on sidewalks,
streets, and adjacent yards increases and so do
potential damages to a builder’s reputation and
the neighborhood, both the residents and
physical environment. If these expected costs
of nonuse increase, ceteris paribus, the builder
is more likely to use a silt fence.
Residents are usually more organized and
might have a greater financial and emotional
stake in a neighborhood if there is a home
owners association. An increase in the number
of lots with houses under construction per built
and, typically, per occupied house in a sub-
division implies an increase in the likelihood
that a resident would experience adverse im-
pacts of soil that would erode onto sidewalks,
streets, or adjacent yards. A resident whose
social connectivity or experience of potential
damage grows would be more likely to com-
plain to her neighbors, inspectors, and a builder
who would otherwise not install a silt fence. As
a result, the builder’s awareness of his potential
damage to the neighborhood and expected loss
of reputation would likely be greater in a sub-
division where a home owners association ex-
ists or relatively many houses are under con-
struction per resident. In response, the builder
would be more likely to install a silt fence.
Anincreaseintheageofasubdivisionimplies
two possible changes that affect silt-fence use.
First, the social connectivity of neighbors might
increasebecauseresidentsgettoknoweachother
over time. As residents get to know each other
over time, they might be less likely to tolerate
eroded soil that would accumulate on surround-
ing roads, nearby sidewalks, and adjacent yards.
Second, a developer and future homeowners
learnaboutbuilders’reputationsastimepassesin
the subdivision. The more reputable the builder,
the more environmentally and socially re-
sponsible he might be and the more likely he
would comply with this aspect of the SWPPP.
Implications for Research and Policy
The socio-economic model undoubtedly sim-
plifies the reality of a builder’s use of a silt
fence on a lot with a house under construction.
Nonetheless, the empirical results are consis-
tent with even simpler models in which the
builder considers the effects of silt-fence use
on his profits and reputation or his profits and
the neighborhood where he works. In either
case, our results suggest that, in addition to
a builder’s relationship with government in-
spectors (Burby and Paterson, 1993), his re-
lationships with the developer and neighbor-
hood and the relationships among neighbors
matter for compliance. Identification and mea-
surement of reliable predictors of how much
a builder cares about the neighborhood where
he works, independent of his other motives, is
important for future research.
The empirical model only partially explains
the incidence of silt-fence use and was esti-
mated with data about characteristics of lots
and subdivisions in only one fast-growing, ur-
ban county of one southeastern state. Whether
a developer’s sale of a lot to an independent
builder or future homeowner reduces the prob-
abilityofsilt-fenceuseandwhetherthepresence
of a home owners association in a subdivision
or the age of the subdivision increase this
probability in other counties in South Carolina
and other states are important, yet-unanswered
questions. Also, information about costs of silt-
fence installation on a particular lot and the
heated floor space per story of the house under
construction should be linked with information
about the use of a silt fence on the property for
all, not just some, lots in future samples. During
2006 Richland County’s stormwater officials
became certified as SWPPP inspectors and code
enforcement officers (Valavala, 2006). Whether
the probability of silt-fence use has increased as
a result of extra training or the on-site power to
issue tickets are other questions with policy
relevance.
Our results enable us to suggest that gov-
ernment officials could improve builder com-
pliancewith SWPPPs in this county and possibly
other similar ones if they target inspections. In
particular, inspectors should target subdivisions
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, February 2010 66where the developer has already sold un-
improved lots or no home owners association
exists. Inspectors should also focus on sub-
divisions where costs of silt-fence use would be
relatively high because lots are relatively
large. Compliance could also improve if offi-
cials inspect subdivisions where a relatively
small number of houses are under construction
per occupied house or most residents are
newcomers.
[Received July 2007; Accepted September 2009.]
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